Preventing Ukraine from falling into darkness

Russia is trying to strategically destroy Ukraine’s ability to supply its population and economy with electricity and heat. However a number of complimentary energy-side measures can minimize the risks.

Georg Zachmann is Scientific Lead Green Deal Ukraїna at Helmholtz Zentrum Berlin

Russia has been expanding drones, cruise and ballistic missiles worth billions of dollars’ to wreck gas storages, transformer stations, heat and power plants, even in cities far from the frontlines.

So far, Ukraine withstood this and prevented a prolonged black-out. As vital heat and water supply depend on the reliable provision of electricity, incapacitating the Ukrainian electricity system would cause a humanitarian disaster, likely triggering another wave of refugees.

By now, more than 80 percent of the capacities in conventional plants available before 2022 were occupied, destroyed or at least attacked. Almost all of the coal fired power plants are offline, many hydro-power plants were attacked.

Despite refueling of some units, the three nuclear plants represent about half of the current generation. Even together with renewables, hydro and thermal plants as well as imports, the supply does not meet demand – requiring scheduled power cuts.

So far, cannibalization of redundant units, emergency electricity imports, scheduled power cuts and repairs under constant thread of attacks prevented the worst. But the race against time risks to being lost, ahead of the coming winter. The impacts of continuing attacks cannot be patched quickly enough, while lower solar generation as well as higher electricity demand in winter will require additional supply.

In the still unlikely case that the entire system trips, the lack of flexible units will make it more challenging to quickly recover it. At worst the three currently operating nuclear plants would then have to rely on the local cooling back-up systems.

As of today, if none of the attacked plants can be repaired, in almost 90% of the time some Ukrainians will not get electricity in winter and overall, a fifth of the electricity demand cannot be met. But this is not a fait accompli.

The most important component to secure electricity supplies next winter is strengthening Ukraine’s air defense.

However a number of complimentary energy-side measures can minimize the risks.

First, it is possible to enable higher electricity exports from the EU, requiring regulatory adjustments as well as some investments – such as strengthening a specific sub-station in Hungary. Well-connected additional power units ‘outside’ of Ukraine might also be considered.

Second, repairing partly damaged power-plants can provide a lot of capacity faster and at lower cost than most other solutions. Hence, getting the right parts into the country remains essential.

Third, deploying relatively small gas generation units – they come in sizes ranging from container-sized to full gas-turbines – can underpin a more resilient decentralized system without locking in too much capital in fossil assets. Their use will, however, depend on the availability of gas and gas infrastructure.

Fourth, renewables and batteries can provide value beyond the immediate crisis. Second-hand wind turbines might even produce during winter, while solar panels might keep the lights on while nuclear power plants undergo refueling in summer.

Only an all-of-the-above-approach will minimize the risks. And the challenge is not only about technologies. All these solutions require substantial logistical, technical, insurance and financial support from Ukraine’s partners.

The Ukraine recovery conference on 11 – 12 June might be the right place to commit to increasing corresponding funding lines and to invest political capital into delivering the needed appliances and expertise to Ukraine quickly. This may mean overruling peace-time concerns on network-development, emission-thresholds or technology-preferences.

A clear strategy and prioritisation of feasible steps is needed to make Ukraine’s electricity system reliant. A well-resourced and staffed energy situation room that pulls together all the necessary data, conducts wargaming and coordinates the support from partners would be very desirable.

In parallel, Ukraine should urgently work with its partners on de-risking private investments that provide electricity system services. For example, taking over the war risk as well as some governance risk when dealing with the Ukrainian electricity market could activate private capital in both Ukraine and elsewhere.

This could encourage the private financing and construction of generation assets that best meet the market needs – as expressed by Ukrainian electricity market prices.

Such an approach would not only prevent a further fragmentation of the system but also nurture the development of a competitive electricity market that will be crucial to attract the investments needed during reconstruction.