Belgrade’s ‘Holy Grail’ in the struggle with Kosovo is a fake

A large part of the troubles that Serbia is facing today in finding a solution to the issue of Kosovo arises from a long-standing blind belief that UN Security Council Resolution 1244 is some Holy Grail that holds Kosovo to Serbia, writes Orhan Dragaš.

Orhan Dragaš is the founder and director of the International Security Institute based in Belgrade.

In Serbia, the number 1244 became step by step, the myth of almost the same magic power as the number 1389 (the year of the Battle of Kosovo). However, not many have read with an open mind the famous Resolution and tried to rationalise it in the context of life to which they were personally exposed. Back in 1999, it was easier not to read what was written but rather to accept Milosevic’s reading that Resolution 1244 preserves the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY / Serbia and that this decision of the Security Council is a thumbs up at the just struggle of Serbia and its people.

And Serbs have been holding to such an interpretation of Milosevic’s losing policy, without rechecking it, for 24 years. And in that time, Kosovo strengthened its independence more and more, and Serbia increasingly lost connection with its former province.

Today, on the eve of big decisions, it would be beneficial to turn to Resolution 1244. Because we should finally ask ourselves – why are the Kosovo Albanians pushing Resolution 1244 when defending themselves, and why did each state that recognised Kosovo’s independence do so by referring to Resolution 1244? Why is that decision by the UN Security Council, for many Serbs, still a Holy Grail?

First, Resolution 1244 did not fall from the sky. Just over a year before it entered into force, it was preceded by four Security Council resolutions that dealt with the conflict in Kosovo, civilian casualties, refugees and warnings that peace was dangerously at stake. The Security Council made all these decisions by referring to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which discusses the involvement of the world organisation in the resolution of armed conflicts.

The first of the four resolutions preceding 1244 was from March 1998, a year before the NATO bombings. Even then, the Security Council seriously warned Serbia about its forces using violence against civilians and warned the KLA to suspend its actions.

At that time, an embargo on arms imports was imposed on the FR of Yugoslavia at the time, and the US froze assets and accounts for those close to the government and Milosevic. The Security Council had already asked the Hague Tribunal to collect information about possible crimes committed against civilians in Kosovo.

Where can you find a stronger warning that there is something wrong with your policy, especially if you have in mind that for this resolution (No. 1160), Russia also voted (Russia was not against any of the four following resolutions dedicated to Kosovo)?

In the next resolution, 1199 of September 23, 1998, the Security Council condemned the use of the force of Serbian security forces and the Army, resulting in the exodus of 230,000 Kosovo Albanians (according to then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan)!

Again, the Security Council called for a peaceful, political solution that would provide Kosovo with “autonomy and self-determination”, strong wording which would become the legal framework for the declaration of Kosovo’s independence. Once again, all members of the Security Council (and Russia) voted for this resolution, except for China, which traditionally considers this to be an internal rather than an international issue.

Just a month later, the Security Council dramatically concluded that peace was threatened, called again on Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, urged the FRY to implement earlier resolutions, the occasion being a massacre in the village of Gornje Obrinje in Kosovo, where Serb security forces killed more than 20 Albanian civilians, including women and children. The Security Council accepted and supported the agreement that the OSCE Verification Mission comes to Kosovo.

Finally, amid the bombings, on 14 May 1999, the Security Council, with a new resolution, dramatically warned of a humanitarian catastrophe in and around Kosovo and called for access to its staff in endangered areas.

After three months of bombing, the “immortal” Resolution 1244 arrived, which refers to all these previous warnings and, in particular, to Chapter 7 of the UN Charter, which authorises the World Organisation to use non-armed methods to resolve the conflict which threatens the peace before reaching for the arms.

This was precisely what was done before the bombing (arms embargo, constant warnings, calling for political talks, sending humanitarian missions …), but the regime in Belgrade ignored that.

Resolution 1244, the Serbian “Holy Grail”, says that peace is violated by “acts of violence against the inhabitants of Kosovo”, which were, therefore, committed by government forces, as well as “terrorist acts of any side”. The exact resolution in many places gives solutions for Kosovo from the Rambouillet Agreement (1999), which Serbia triumphantly refused to sign. Nevertheless, it was later accepted, through parts of Resolution 1244, after the country’s defeat in a three-month bombing.

It is true that Resolution 1244 respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the then FRY but also demands “full respect” of the Rambouillet Agreement! This agreement calls for launching an international mechanism to determine Kosovo’s final status after three years.

Just observe the basis: “the will of the people, the opinions of the relevant authorities, the Helsinki Final Act and the participation of all parties in implementing the Rambouillet Agreement”. So – the will of the people of Kosovo (Albanians), the principle of self-determination (Helsinki Final Act).

Therefore, Resolution 1244 can be a legitimate “Holy Grail” for the Kosovo Albanians and their declaration of independence and for all those who have recognised this independence.

Resolution 1244 is not an anchor that binds Kosovo to Serbia; it should not be the Serbian “Holy Grail” because its significance in today’s real political relations is irrelevant.

This resolution resides on the fact that it is the only remaining political tie that connects the interests of some in Serbia and the Kremlin, and in this lies the only secret of its longevity. If Serbia gives up the figure 1244 as an argument in the difficult and crucial phase of the struggle for lasting peace between Serbs and Albanians, this would be a great service for Serbia and its future.