By Alexandra Brzozowski, Aurélie Pugnet and Benjamin Fox | Euractiv.com Est. 8min 29-08-2023 EU's chief diplomat Josep Borrell in Brussels, Belgium, 22 May 2023. [EPA-EFE/OLIVIER HOSLET] Euractiv is part of the Trust Project >>> Languages: Français | DeutschPrint Email Facebook X LinkedIn WhatsApp Telegram After the recent Niger coup, EU foreign and defence ministers this week are expected to discuss a strategy to deal with the situation and reassess the bloc’s approach to the Sahel region, according to an internal memo seen by EURACTIV. On his visit to Niger in early July, the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell described the country as an essential EU partner at the heart of the Sahel, the semi-arid region that stretches West to East south of the Sahara desert. Just weeks later, Niger became the latest domino in a row of countries in the region that have toppled into the hands of military juntas. On 26 July, the country’s presidential guard detained President Mohamed Bazoum and guard commander, General Abdourahamane Tchiani, declared himself a military junta leader. This is the fifth coup since the country’s independence from France in 1960. The coup “surprised many observers at first because Niger was on a relatively linear political, economic and social trajectory, despite significant security pressure on all of its borders,” the internal memo, prepared by the EU’s diplomatic service (EEAS) and distributed to member states ahead of the informal ministers’ meetings in Spain, reads. After the coups in Burkina Faso and Mali in 2019, it also comes amid concerns of a reinforced Russian presence in Africa at a time when Moscow and the West are engaged in geopolitical competition against the backdrop of Russia’s war in Ukraine. The EU also faces a loss of a “like-minded partner” in an increasingly turbulent region, where for eight years, Niger has played a key role in restricting sub-Saharan migration flows to Europe via North Africa, a model of outsourcing its migration policy the EU has seen waver since the coup d’état that took place on July 26 in Niamey. Blindsided again According to the memo, EU’s chief diplomat Josep Borrell is expected to ask member states how the EU should “adapt its approach to Niger” and “depending on how the situation evolves, what position would the EU be prepared to consider in terms of development aid, security migration and border management”. So far, there was agreement inside the bloc to remain involved in the Sahel region despite the worsening relationship, deteriorating trust of many of the country’s populations, and repeated coups d’états. EU ministers are also expected to reflect on how to “best safeguard our interests and objectives in the sub-region, particularly in the field of security (combating terrorism, countering the influence of the Wagner group) and controlling irregular migration when the three central Sahel states are ruled by military juntas and radical armed groups are pursuing a strategy of territorial expansion”. “We must not abandon the region and leave it to third countries, such as China or Russia,” one EU diplomat told EURACTIV. “A reflection on the role” of the EU’s security and defence policy in the Sahel “is welcome in this respect,” they added. However, while this week’s ministerial will not produce any decisions but only serve as an opportunity to discuss the matter informally, EU officials and diplomats since the start of the Niger crisis in July have warned it will be difficult to achieve unanimity for any actions. “The outcome of the current political crisis in Niger is still uncertain and will depend, among other things, on the actions taken by ECOWAS in terms of sanctions, dialogue initiatives or, conversely, the use of force, [and] on how the African Union supports the regional organisation,” the EU memo states. “It should be noted that the United States is a privileged partner with which the EU could deepen coordination in managing this crisis,” it adds. However, ministers’ discussions will also need to go beyond Niger, asking the question of why after Russia’s war in Ukraine, the bloc yet again didn’t anticipate another crisis that could potentially impact it. “It’s frustrating – you’d think we would make better use of our diplomatic missions and intelligence services after what happened to Ukraine,” a second EU diplomat quipped. “But we’re stuck with the same problem as before – a lack of proper situation awareness,” they added. ECOWAS dilemma The EU’s involvement will likely remain limited to political support for the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) as it faces a careful balancing act. While the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has threatened military intervention, it has failed to secure African Union backing for using force. Togo is believed to have opened its own talks with the NIger junta, and several ECOWAS members are lukewarm about threatening intervention. The United States, which has just posted a new ambassador, Kathleen FitzGibbon, to Niamey, strongly prefers the diplomatic route. France, the most engaged EU country in the Sahel, backs ECOWAS’s threat of force, but its unpopularity among Francophone West Africans means it must keep a low profile. The EU on Monday expressed its “full support” for the French ambassador to Niger after the soldiers who seized power in the country demanded his departure. “The decision of the putschists to expel the French ambassador is a new provocation which cannot in any way help to find a diplomatic solution to the current crisis,” EU spokeswoman for foreign affairs, Nabila Massrali, said, adding that the bloc “does not recognise” the authorities that seized power in Niger. At the same time, EU member states are reluctant to agree to any military support to ECOWAS in the short term if it were to intervene militarily in Niger, as it has been saying it could, EURACTIV understands. While the regional organisation has requested the EU’s diplomatic service to receive lethal equipment under the European Peace Facility (EPF) umbrella, member states are more inclined to send non-lethal aid in support of their crisis management intervention if material support there would be. Wagner looming The US has said Russia’s Wagner mercenary group is “taking advantage” of instability in Niger, and according to AP and reports from France 24, a coup leader General Salifou Mody visited Mali shortly after the coup and made contact with someone from Wagner, to ask for assistance. However, there is no evidence that Wagner fighters have been present in Niger while they remain active in other African countries such as Mali and the Central African Republic. Meanwhile, the use of Russian flags in public demonstrations by pro-junta supporters in Niamey is a sign the putschists already seem to be flirting with that sort of support and of the propaganda battle that Europe faces, EU diplomats say. Whether the Wagner group’s role will change in the Sahel and, more broadly, across sub-Saharan Africa is less clear. Insiders describe Wagner as being akin to a multi-headed hydra. The aborted mutiny against Putin launched by Progozhin in June had already put question marks on the future of Wagner’s numerous operations across Africa. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said that the fate of Wagner’s contracts was entirely in the hands of African states, though Putin then remarked that Wagner was “fully financed” by the Russian state. Prigozhin was then spotted at July’s Russia-Africa summit hosted by Putin in Saint Petersburg. Hundreds of Wagner Group fighters departed the Central African Republic (CAR) in the days following the mutiny, only for forces to return weeks later. Whether it is merged with one or more Russian private military contractors or folded into the state military apparatus, Prigozhin’s death is unlikely to leave a significant vacuum or change much on the ground in the Sahel, CAR and elsewhere. [Edited by Alice Taylor] Read more with Euractiv In Sochi, Erdoğan will push Putin on grain dealTurkey said Monday that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan will "soon" visit Russia for talks with Vladimir Putin on reviving a Black Sea grain deal that could be used as a springboard for broader Ukraine peace negotiations.
