Europe’s strategic autonomy rests on the ‘Middle Corridor’ 

There’s one ‘trading area and corridor’ that fulfils many of the prerequisites for a Europe able to stand on its own feet, economically and in terms of geostrategy – the Middle Corridor going all the way from the Balkans to Central Asia, writes Samuel Doveri Vesterbye.

Samuel Doveri Vesterbye is the managing director at the European Neighbourhood Council (ENC).

Seven years after Emmanuel Macron’s ‘Sorbonne Speech’, the French president decided to deliver a second speech about Europe. This time the main message was about Europe’s need to stand on its own feet economically and militarily.

President Macron noted that “. . . we want to decarbonise our economies and respond to biodiversity and climate challenges; we want to ensure our sovereignty and thus have full control over our strategic production chains; and we want to keep our economy open to maintain our status as a major trading power”. 

But is “European Strategic Autonomy” realistic with a German economy in recession (last quarter 2023) and trade routes to Asia under attack from piracy and Houthis?  

The reasons are straightforward, according to research institutions like the Delors Centre and leading economic journalists.

First, you need access to critical raw materials, followed by competitive labour costs and well-priced traditional and renewable energy sources. That’s the only way for the EU economy to grow and stay competitive, and thereby maintain its global economic sovereignty.

Expert economists from leading international financial institutions, including the World Bank, also indicate that Europe needs to diversify its increasingly volatile maritime trade routes to the world’s largest markets in India, China and the rest of Asia.

“As trade volumes between Asia and Europe continue to grow and as geopolitical events disrupt existing trade corridors, major trading and logistics companies are exploring ways to diversify and optimise transport routes and make them more sustainable,” reads last year’s Impact Assessment by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).

Europe’s intelligent moves toward de-risking from over-reliance on Chinese technology and critical raw materials, however, necessitate new areas where the EU can relocate its supply chains while preserving cost-effective pricing, access to cheap energy and mine titanium, uranium, silicone and a range of other elements necessary for European industries.  

There’s one ‘trading area and corridor’ that fulfills many of these conditions: the Middle Corridor, spanning from the Balkans, Turkey and the Black Sea into the South Caucasus, the Caspian Sea and Central Asia.

Kazakhstan’s sheer size (2,724,900 sq km or the equivalent of France, UK, Germany, Romania, Italy, and Poland put together) provides enormous space for solar panels and wind farms (economies of scale) to support large-scale industrial hydrogen production along the Caspian Sea (low salinity).

A recent €10 billion EBRD investment in Central Asia proves how serious business investors are about the Middle Corridor.

Uzbekistan’s resource rich-accessibility stands to supply an enormous amount of necessary critical raw materials, while Turkey and the Western Balkans bring other advantages, including decades of EU supply-chain experience, technology, cost-effective labour markets, as well as harmonised regulatory frameworks, and developed road and rail connections for the transport of goods.

The icing on the cake is the fact that the Middle Corridor, contrary to popular belief, provides a safe passage of Chinese goods to Europe, and vice-versa, which fulfils Macron’s condition of Europe’s necessary balancing act between China and the US to preserve the maximum leverage, negotiation power and – per definition – strategic autonomy.  

But what does this mean for Europeans who seek strategic autonomy or simply want economic growth and innovation?  

Firstly, it doesn’t mean that other corridors are unimportant (e.g. Israel and Suez). It’s about diversifying and optimising European security of supply, energy, and access.

Secondly, the nitty-gritty policy details make a difference in transport policy.

For example, visa facilitation for truck drivers in Turkey and the unblocking of European Investment Bank funds, are fundamental for the survival of European economic growth policy and strategic autonomy, along with Customs Union reform.

Thirdly, the EU could use the Middle Corridor policy (a big priority for Ankara) to reign in an otherwise volatile Turkey, which has hedged between Russia and the West for far too long, while causing trouble for member states like Cyprus, Greece, France and much of Central and Eastern Europe due to Ankara’s Moscow policies.

For strategists in France and economists in Berlin, it will come as no surprise that a European landmass with blocked access to Asia (e.g. Russia and potentially Turkiye) is un-strategic and economically harmful in the long run.

Fourthly, a successful Middle Corridor rests on a careful balancing act between the US and China, since both will indirectly try to propose and oppose part of the initiative.

Supporting supply-chain relocation (e.g. away from China) and regional integration along the Middle Corridor will prove key to guarantee US support. 

 A longer version of this opinion piece can be found here.